The research and activism arm of BlackBox Voting.com

  Oct. 17, 2003 They've taken out BlackBoxVoting.com, the site owned by the Black Box Voting publisher, for the third time in a month.

This is another bogus spam complaint. The first time: It was a bogus spammer, some religious looney web site who sent spam referring to us and then notified Spamcops. Their web site was not taken out, we were. We were cleared of any involvement and the site restored. The second time, it was a hacker that said "I told you to leave me alone!" This time, it is another bogus spam complaint. We are awaiting an answer as to what the offending "spam" was and who complained. We do have an opt-in list of activists; I have saved all the opt-ins, and if a mole opted in and then filed a bogus complaint, I will find this person and sue for damages. The sister site, BlackBoxVoting.org, which I own, has been shut down due to a Diebold demand.

Here are the book chapters that "whoever it is" keeps trying to block your access to:

Black Box Voting
Chapter 1: A Call to Engage
Chapter 2: Documentation of Miscounted Elections
Chapter 3: Solutions
Chapter 4: Can These Things Be Rigged?
Chapter 5: Certification system is broken
Chapter 6: Chuck Hagel: Poster boy for conflict of interest
Chapter 7: The first - ever - look inside a secret voting system
Chapter 8: Who's minding the store?
Chapter 9: Who - or What - is "rob-georgia?" ROB steps forward

Oct. 7, 2003

Announcement: California Recall: Post live, real-time trouble reports here:

http://www.bbvreport.org/

BBV Report is sponsored by Black Box Voting and provides a live, interactive forum to post concerns and problems with voting in the California recall election on Oct. 7.

The BBV Report site will be up through the election and until a final resolution is reached on the election. Please spread this to your e-mail list, especially those of you in California.

THIS JUST IN
Voting Machine Memos Suggest Suspect California Election...Memos Raise Serious Ballot-Count Questions

Oct. 3, 2003

Well, they got us. Whoever "they" is. Apparently they are so afraid of whatever is in the book, which we are giving away for free, that they have taken out BOTH of the Black Box Voting web sites.

I'll explain what was done to both web sites in a minute.

We have two web sites: http://www.blackboxvoting.com/ and http://www.blackboxvoting.org/.

The .org site was taken down by AIT Inc., after Diebold sent a DMCA pull-down demand citing objections to a link to an unrelated page with a link that led to embarrassing memos from Diebold. Then, overstepping their bounds, they took down not only the page with the link, but the entire web site, some 300 pages, and refused to reinstate for "10-14 days" -- and maybe not even then.

Overstepping still further, our access to our own FTP containing our web files was blocked. My publisher negotiated tech-to-tech with AIT Inc., and they released the files after some 48 hours. I proceeded to arrange to move my domain to a new server.

Now it turns out that I am prohibited from moving my domain (the name, blackboxvoting.org) to a new server, and this will continue until Oct. 9, according to my domain registrar. I will keep working on this.

The .COM site

We were blocked from any access to it. This site belongs to my publisher, and has an entirely different ISP. It was taken down with no notice.

The reason given was that we had sent spam -- however, we had not done so. We traced the offending spam back to its web owner, a looney religious site that had nothing to do with us. Spamcop absolved us, and the ISP should never have done a takedown without investigating. At first, they told us "there is no appeal."

We were told we now have to leave the ISP and relocate the domain elsewhere.

Now, I don't see anything objectionable in the book, and I encourage you to look at it -- and see what you think. It is carefully documented.

What are they so very afraid of? Why all the shutdowns?

Democratic National Committee decides to insist on a paper trail

That's great, but not quite enough. We need a paper BALLOT not a paper "trail." The difference has to do with what is considered the legal record of your vote, which should be the ballot you verify, not bits and bytes in a machine.

Also, the paper ballot is just half the battle -- using that ballot to audit the machines is the other half. Did you know that most states don't allow that? What good is a paper ballot if you aren't allowed to use it for an audit?

Another fighting ground will be the new, secret, computerized voter registration systems developed by the same companies that developed flawed computerized vote-counting systems.

Prepare to engage. We can win this thing!

About Qui Tam.

A Qui Tam suit allows a citizen to sue if the government has spent money based on fraudulent claims, and the citizen can make up to 30% of what the government spent. The voting machine issue has the words "qui tam" written all over it. Perhaps a billion dollars is up for grabs, and whoever files claims first in each area gets it.

Here's the catch: When you do this, the case is sealed. No one will ever know you filed. The evidence is also sealed. In short, there is a chance that no American citizen will ever know the truth, if activists chase the qui tam money. The qui tam suit also releases the filer from liability.

I've been approached over and over by lawyers who want me to file qui tam. Each time, I've turned it down. Now, if you want to know who has filed these suits, just observe which activists who normally are vocal but suddenly become mute. I ask you to step forward and replace their voice with your own.

-- Bev Harris

More info: http://www.blackboxvoting.com/

Oct. 1, 2003

An open letter from Bev Harris

Dear Everybody,

Black Box Voting – The book is out of the gate. Go here for FREE electronic chapters 1-2. New uploads are scheduled every two days. (They may come sooner.)

http://www.blackboxvoting.com/

The book is also mirrored in PDF format on Scoop's "A Very American Coup Page"

http://www.scoop.co.nz/mason/features/?s=usacoup

I would very much appreciate it if you post every chapter you get at your web site, distribute them to public officials, call reporters about them, e-mail this message to your contact lists. If you are a journalist, review the information. If the site goes down, due to hacking or legal retaliation by voting machine vendors, write about it.

If you are a citizen who is skilled with flash media or shockwave, we encourage you to create presentations; you will find it easy to script them when you read these chapters. Whether your work takes a serious or humorous tone, you'll have plenty of fodder to work with. Write songs, perform poetry, make documentaries. Don't wait. We can solve this thing, and we can do so quickly, but you must get involved.

(TIP: Watch for 'real time' voting forum to go live with citizen voting reports, on Monday, just in time for the California recall).

The Black Box Voting project has been 'open sourced' from the get- go. It was an 'open source' investigation, with citizens joining in all over the world to contribute expertise and research. We 'open sourced' the book, making electronic versions free of charge. A trade paperback version will also be available so you can distribute attractive and compact versions to everyone who needs them. Select whichever information format meets your needs.

WHAT IS IN THE BLACK BOX VOTING CHAPTERS?

They are posted chapter by chapter, in both PDF and PNG formats. The open source license is quite generous, but of course we ask that you adhere to it. (It contains provisions like: you cannot sell the book for money; you cannot change the book…quite simple, really).

Chapter 1 (which also includes introductory material) explains what the founding fathers had in mind when they chose to control the governance of a country through voting. Chapter 1 contains a call to engage.

Chapter 2 is what we call the 'I don't believe there is a problem' chapter. It contains a dizzying assortment of real voting machine miscounts in real elections, all documented to help you do additional research if you like.

Next: Chapt. 3 – Solutions; Chapt. 4: Can the machines be rigged?

Watch for new uploads – they may appear early. Post them as many places as you can; you should know that there are continuing efforts to block publication of information about how our votes are counted, though doing so has no legal merit and thwarts the First Amendment.

Diebold Election Systems issued a DMCA pull-down demand and successfully shut down BlackBoxVoting.org, the sister site of BlackBoxVoting.com, simply for putting a link to an unrelated page containing a link to damaging internal memos. They asserted copyright privileges (confirming the memos' authenticity). The memos are still available on the web, but Diebold's action shut down our popular discussion and planning forum. We may move our discussion forums to New Zealand, where there is more support for free speech. ES&S sent a threat letter simply because they said the information made them look bad.

Diffusion will help, and we ask you to assist us with this. There is perhaps nothing simpler, or more important, that you can do. Read the chapters and see: There is nothing illegal about them, and citizens throughout the world have an absolute right to the information. If you are a reporter, read the chapters, verify the information for yourself, and then watch: If there is any corporate retaliation, please write about it.

Thanks to all of you who have contributed to bringing these issues into public awareness.

- Bev Harris

Sept 28, 2003

Diebold issued a pull-down demand under DMCA for the BlackBoxVoting.org web site, citing a link posted on a forum in the site, claiming that the link allowed web visitors to visit an unrelated page, containing Diebold internal memos, which they say they own the copyright to.

These memos are more properly termed "Evidence," because they contain evidence of a pattern of lawbreaking that dates back at least to 1999. An injunction needs to be filed immediately in California based on evidence contained in these memos, before forcing citizens in 14 counties to vote on these machines in the recall election in a few days.

- In October 2001 in the "support" directory you will find a thread of memos about altering the audit log in Access. That contains the famous Ken Clark "end-runs around the voting system" quotes.

- In January 2001 in threads that say "(used to be Nov. 2000 election") the memos document that in Volusia County, Florida an unauthorized and mysterious "second upload" of votes was done, overwriting the correct totals with another set of totals, all of which were correct except the presidential race. In this, Al Gore suddenly has MINUS 16,022 votes. The memos say to be careful because "the boogie man" might be reading them and refer to "possible unauthorized upload" and clearly document that there were TWO uploads, from a "card #0" and a "card #3." The Card #3 upload took votes away from Gore, and that card is now missing.

- In April 2000 are memos about using cell phones to intercept and transfer votes.

- Also, since only versions 1.17.17 and earlier, version 1.11.14 of GEMS were ever certified or authorized, watch for all the memos which show they were using unauthorized, unexamined, uncertified versions 1.14.xx and 1.15.xx (various numbers on the end, all are uncertified). What this means is that NO ONE except for one or two programmers in Canada know what was in those programs used to count votes.

- If you download the memos, do a search for the word "fake" and you'll see that in Colorado Springs, they sold software they had never created, and when El Paso County Colorado demanded a demo before cutting a check, they discuss how to fake the demo and say they have done it before.

- Watch also for Ken Clark's discussion of sending uncertified software to California and saying something like "what good are rules if you can't bend them?"

All in all, you will find over 300 memos that document willful violation of the law.

Lexis-Nexis would be a worthwhile exercise now for every one of these search terms pertaining to the origins of Global Election Systems: This firm was a wholly owned subsidiary of North American Professional Technologies, Inc., which was in turn a wholly owned subsidiary of MacroTrends Ventures International, Ltd. Charles Hong Lee is one of the principals with these firms; He has been tied in the press to participation in a scheme to bilk immigrants out of some $47 million; he is also connected with a scandal in which a Mr. Graye was prosecuted, relating to Vinex Wines. Charles Hong Lee was also involved with something called "The Vancouver Maneuver," a stock pump & dump scheme that bilked investors out of millions in connection with an entertainment company and something called Beverly Development. Charles Hong Lee was a principal with Global Election Systems, along with the late Clinton Rickards. Talbot Iredale, currently the V.P. for Research and Development for Diebold Election Systems, began with the company in 1991, right around the time the Vancouver Maneuver was exposed in Barron's magazine. This is the pedigree from whence the Diebold Memos arose.

Sophia Lee may or may not be related to Charles Hong Lee (they are both from Vancouver, they are both originally from Hong Kong, but there are perhaps 10,000 people in Vancouver with the last name of "Lee" -- among the dozen people working for Diebold in Vancouver are Sophia Lee and Whitman Lee). Sophia Lee was in San Luis Obispo County, California on the day that a vote tally mysteriously popped up on the Internet five hours before the polls closed; she is the support tech for King County, Washington which Diebold principal engineer Ken Clark refers to as being "famous for" doing end runs around the voting system using a Microsoft Access hack, and her name is referenced in a strange series of memos for Volusia County, Florida in which programmers and techs discuss the unexplained appearance of an illicit set of votes that replaced the correct set.

Yes, that's right: 16,022 votes were removed from Al Gore's tally on election night when a mysterious, and now "lost" memory card uploaded and overwrote the correct totals. These disappearing votes were noticed by a clerk, who set alarm bells ringing and the tally was corrected, but Diebold programmers now say, in the memos, that the replacement vote upload can't be found. They concede that an extra vote upload was done, and Vice President of research Talbot Iredale says in the memos that it may have been illicit. The Volusia County memos then say something like "You never know when the "boogie man is reading these," suggesting caution.

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Here is a contribution originally from Slashdot, made available for the Black Box Voting book by Donald Way. (Diebold: This is satire and meant for entertainment purposes only. If you would like to spend several more $500 per hour lawyer fees suing us over satire, go right ahead.)

CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT
1. Pending: your vote is now the property of Diebold, Inc. Any attempt on your part to ascertain the disposition of your vote is hereby declared to be in violation of federal law, e.g., the Digital Millenium Copyright Act.

You have the right not to vote. Any vote you make can be used against you in a court of law. The judge presiding in such a court of law may be appointed by Diebold, Inc., and need not require a jury, but if a jury is summoned, it need not be a jury of your peers.

By acting to vote you consent to our determining whether your vote is valid, and in the event it is judged not to be valid, you consent to our voiding your vote and further voiding your right to vote in the future.

You furthermore acknowledge that owing to storage and bandwidth limitations that Diebold, Inc., may experience, your vote may be digitally compressed in a way such that your true intent in casting the vote may be lost. If such an eventuality should occur, your vote may be determined using statistical data derived from any source we deem appropriate or convenient.

You have the right to protest if your vote is cancelled, altered, or in any way modified as the result of such action on our part, however, you hereby acknowledge that in such an eventuality, Diebold, Inc. may determine that your right to vote is deleterious to democracy as implement by Diebold, Inc., and therefore may be considered to be an overt act against the national security of these United States.

You have 10 seconds to comply.

God Bless America

Thu Sept 25 2003
Titanic About to Hit the Iceberg (New York Times)

"For two years, Baltimore County has warned, `Iceberg ahead!' and now independent experts have warned that it's a gigantic iceberg," Mr. [James T.]Smith said. "Maryland should not say, `Damn the iceberg, full speed ahead.' "
New York Times article

Diebold Election Systems, reeling from a series of revelations about security flaws in its voting machines, took another hit when the SAIC report was released yesterday. Only 69 heavily redacted pages (out of 200) were released, raising more questions than they answered.

The SAIC report (Scientific Applications International Corporation), commissioned by the state of Maryland after it purchased some $55 million worth of high risk voting machines, can hardly be called an "independent" review. The SAIC's vice chairman, Bill Owens, also happens to be Chairman of VoteHere, the company that stands to benefit most if the SAIC report manages to identify certain security flaws while helping Diebold remain afloat. VoteHere makes a cryptography system to "verify" votes, which it claims will address Diebold's problems. Activist groups say "no dice" and are standing firm for a paper ballot that voters can verify, rather than more bits, bytes, and secret computer code.

But Diebold doesn't plan to correct security flaws on the rest of them??? According to a Diebold spokesman, "encryption and password upgrades will be made only for the machines destined for Maryland, [Mark] Radke said, and would not be available for the 33,000 touch-screen machines already in use elsewhere."

"Elsewhere" includes California, where 14 counties will be using Diebold machines in a few days for the recall race. The SAIC review found 328 security weaknesses, 26 of them critical, according to the Washington Post. How critical? If you live in Alameda County, Los Angeles, or any of a dozen other California counties, this is what you'll be voting on:

"The results of a successful attack could result in voting results being released too soon, altered, or destroyed. The impact of exploitation could lead to a failure of the elections process by failing to elect to office, or decide in a ballot measure, according to the will of the people. The impact could be a loss of voter confidence, embarrassment to the State, or release of incomplete or inaccurate election results to the media."

Diebold's dysfunctional response

While most of us would read "328 security weaknesses, 26 of them critical" as a bit of a problem, here is how Diebold describes it: ""We are pleased to be moving forward," said Thomas W. Swidarski, president of Diebold Election Systems. "The thorough system assessment conducted by SAIC verifies that the Diebold voting station provides an unprecedented level of election security."

Remember, according to Diebold someone left a file on a web site (it was 40,000 files for six years.) According to Diebold they did not do any patches in Georgia (they installed patches on 22,000 voting machines, not once but over and over, without allowing anyone to examine them).

If you can't show me how my votes get totalled, you lose the right to total my taxes, says one veteran computer programmer who finds the SAIC report unsatisfactory.

"The 200-page report has been shown to Diebold officials and is now being reviewed by the state's Department of Budget and Management and the State Board of Elections" wrote WiredNews. Yet only 69 pages were released, and they are redacted to remove basic information. The section on the GEMS central count program, for example, simply stated that it was deficient and needed to be changed, and then redacted the rest. GEMS is the program under fire in the recent Salon.com article and it affects both optical scan and touch screen systems.

"The voting terminal is an embedded device running Microsoft Windows {Redacted} as its operating system." -- The voting terminal runs on Windows CE, and the reason this appears to be redacted is that, according to an internal memo by Tab Iredale, V.P. Research and Development, they've been trying to avoid letting certifiers have a go at the operating system. The only way they can do this, according to FEC regulations, is to claim it is "COTS" (Commercial Off the Shelf) -- in other words, you buy it in a box and put it on the machine as is. However, Windows CE is not that kind of program. There is no such thing as "off the shelf" Windows CE. It is always fully customized, and, kind of like a set of legos, is programmed to fit. Therefore, it must be certified. Since Diebold has been trying to avoid certifying Windows CE, its existence was redacted.

"The currently used version of the AccuVote-TS software is {Redacted}" -- It is inexcusable to decline to say what version is being examined. Only the official NASED certified version is allowed to be used in elections. Either SAIC examined something that is not certified and has never been used, or they examined something certified that has been used. Either way, we have a right to know!

The methodology used to count your votes is redacted?
"Purpose and function of the AccuVote-TS voting system:
- Generate electronic ballots;
- Permit voters to view and cast their votes electronically;
- Record, store, and report vote totals; and
- Provide accurate electronic audit trails to ensure integrity of the AccuVote-TS voting system.
{Redacted}

The "What the hell happened" questions

- What the hell happened here? Ciber Inc. certified this stuff!
- What the hell happened here? Wyle Laboratories certified it too!
- What the hell happened here? NASED certified it too!
- What the hell happened here? Official Georgia voting machine examiner Brit Williams certified it too!
- What the hell happened here? The Diebold memos show they use versions that weren't even certified.

Could there be any better evidence that our "testing and certification" system is BROKEN?!?

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Next: Multimedia voting machine presentation by Take Back The Media (yeah; turn up the sound, guys).
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Oh, and yes: Diebold has been playing whackamole. Or there is another way to look at it: Hiding the evidence of lawbreaking. After 15,000 internal memos were leaked, Diebold tried to force http://www.blackboxvoting.org/ to shut down, claiming copyright because of a LINK on the site, but also sent a cease & desist letter to Global Free Press demanding removal of a search engine which quickly and easily finds information in the memos. By running search terms like "fake" "hack" "fix" "broken" and "boogie man" it quickly becomes apparent that evidence critical to the public interest is being hidden.

Why is this company still selling voting machines?